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By Yunus Aksoy and Henrique S. Basso and Ron P. Smith and
Tobias Grasl∗
We estimate the effect of changes in demographic structure on
long-term trends of key macroeconomic variables using a Panel
VAR for 21 OECD economies from 1970-2014. The panel data va-
riation assists the identification of demographic effects, while the
dynamic structure, incorporating multiple channels of influence,
uncovers long-term effects. We propose a theoretical model, re-
lating demographics, innovation and growth, whose simulations
match our empirical findings. The current trend of population
ageing and low fertility is projected to reduce output growth, in-
vestment and real interest rates across OECD countries.
JEL: E32, J11
Keywords: population age profile, output growth, innovation, life-
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Since the Great Recession, slow recovery and reducing productivity growth have
prompted concern about longer run prospects for developed economies and the
danger of secular stagnation. Debate has centred on the production of new ideas
and the structural trends that may shape future economic conditions. While there
has been disagreement on the future rate of production of new ideas (see Gordon
(2012, 2014), Fernald and Jones (2014) and Brynjolfsson and McAfee (2011)),
there is more agreement about the importance of structural trends. In particular
demographic changes, through their impact on labour supply, are often seen as
one of the ‘headwinds’ of the observed slowdown in macroeconomic performance.
We argue that demography matters more generally for macroeconomic activity,
altering demand, supply and the production of ideas.
Figure 1 shows how reduced fertility and increased longevity have changed the
age profile of the advanced economies. The average proportion of the population
∗ Aksoy, Smith and Grasl: Birkbeck, University of London, Malet Street, WC1E 7HX, London, United
Kingdom, e-mails: y.aksoy@bbk.ac.uk, r.smith@bbk.ac.uk, t.grasl@bbk.ac.uk. Basso: Banco de Espan˜a,
DG Economics, Statistics and Research, Alcala´ 48, 28014, Madrid, Spain. e-mail: henrique.basso@bde.es.
We would like to thank, without implicating, three anonymous referees, Antonio Antunes (discussant),
Georg Ba¨urle (discussant), James Costain, Charles Goodhart, Hubert Kempf, Roberto Pancrazi (discus-
sant), Marc-Alexandre Senegas, Christian Siegel (discussant), Henry Siu (discussant), Murat Yıldızog˘lu
and seminar participants at the Banco de Espan˜a, the European Central Bank, Oxford University, ENS
Cachan-Paris, University of Nottingham, University of Bordeaux (GREThA) and Carlos III Madrid, the
BCAM conference at Birkbeck, 23rd CEPR ESSIM 2015 in Taragona, the 6th Joint Bank of Canada
and ECB Conference in Ottawa, the 2016 EABCN Conference on “Medium and Long Run Implications
of Financial Crisis” in Zurich, CEF 2016 in Bordeaux, CGBCR Conference 2016 in Manchester, 5th Lu-
BraMacro - 2016, a CEPR/BoF conference 2017 in Helsinki. Grasl acknowledges PhD financial support
from the Economic and Social Research Council (ESRC). Aksoy, Basso and Smith are also affiliated with
Birkbeck Centre for Applied Macroeconomics (BCAM). The views expressed in this paper are those of
the authors and do not necessarily coincide with those of the Banco de Espan˜a and the Eurosystem.
1
2 AMERICAN ECONOMIC JOURNAL MONTH YEAR
aged 60+ across our sample is projected to increase from 16 in 1970 to 29 percent
in 2030, with most of the corresponding decline experienced in the 0− 19 group.
Kuznets (1960) stressed how changes in demographic structure on the population
of producers, savers and consumers can affect the medium and long-term ma-
croeconomic prospects (Kuznets cycles). Age structure matters since age groups
differ in their (i) savings behaviour, according to the life-cycle hypothesis; (ii)
productivity levels, according to the age profile of wages; (iii) labour input, the
young and old tend not to work; (iv) contribution to innovation, with young and
middle age workers contributing the most; and (v) investment opportunities, as
firms target their different needs.
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Figure 1. Share of Three Age Groups by Year - (Unweighted) Sample Mean
This paper provides an empirical and theoretical investigation of the effects of
changes in demographic structure on longer-term macroeconomic trends. We find
that ageing in advanced economies generates lower growth, lower investment and
lower real interest rates. These effects can be traced both to variations in age
related expenditures and savings and, most importantly, to changes in aggregate
supply, in particular through a lower rate of innovation.
While the theoretical literature and most economic commentary on policy em-
phasise the importance of demographic structure, the econometric evidence for
its importance is less compelling. There are a number of reasons for this. First,
changes in demographic structure are low frequency phenomena, difficult to dis-
tinguish from other low frequency trends that dominate economic time series.
Second, the vector of proportions in each age group is inevitably highly colli-
near, making precise estimation of their effect difficult. Hence it is common to
impose strong restrictions on the age structure, for instance through the use a
single variable, the dependency ratio. Finally, single-equation models explaining
some dependent variable by a set of factors including demographics are unlikely
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to capture the general equilibrium effects of demography. We address these issues
by estimating a Panel VAR for a vector of six key macro variables, augmented
by demographics, for 21 OECD economies over the period 1970-2014. Using six
macro variables allows for multiple channels of influence. The panel variation
helps identify a life cycle pattern in the effects of the slowly moving age profile
on all the variables. Young and old dependants have a negative impact on eco-
nomic activity while workers contribute positively. The dynamic structure of the
VAR, allowing for the feedbacks through the variables of interest, reveals long-run
effects that are stronger than short-run effects.
We use our long-run estimates and the United Nations (UN) population pre-
dictions to make conditional projections of the effect of demographic change for
each country in our sample. The changes in age profile lead to a statistically and
economically significant drop in investment, savings, growth and interest rates
for most OECD economies. Trend output growth is expected to be reduced on
average by 0.64 percent during the 2015-2025 decade.
If the main effect of ageing was through aggregate expenditure effects, such as
the incentive to increase savings due to higher life expectancy, one would expect
interest rates to fall and investment to increase. We find that both the real
rate of interest and investment decrease as society ages, which indicates that a
supply side effect, through the return on capital, must be in effect. To investigate
this we extend our model to analyse the impact of demographics on innovative
activities, proxied by the number of patent applications per capita. We find
evidence that the production of patents are affected by the age structure of the
society, with middle-aged workers (30-49) having a positive impact on patenting
while dependants impact negatively. Thus, ageing may result in lower rates of
innovation, and hence marginal productivity, reducing the rate of return of capital
as suggested by Gordon (2012).
To help interpret the life cycle effects observed in the data, we develop a theo-
retical model of the impact of demography on the macroeconomy. The model has
three generations (young, workers and retirees), investment in human capital, en-
dogenous productivity and medium-term dynamics. It allows us to examine the
longer-term interaction between demographic changes and savings, investment
and innovation, which shape the evolution of output growth.
Using the UN population predictions we show that the theoretical model is
able to replicate our empirical findings. While our model also contains an aggre-
gate expenditure channel,1 the key mechanism in the model is the link between
demographics and innovation. A change in the demographic profile towards an
older society leads to a decline in innovation and the marginal product of capital,
reducing investment and growth. This may explain why advanced economies find
it difficult to revive economic activity despite low interest rates.
1Our aggregate expenditures channel effectively lowers potential output. Note that this is distinct
to the aggregate demand externalities explored in the revived secular stagnation literature, which rely
on nominal rigidities and constrained monetary policy altering the gap between output and its potential
level.
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There is a large empirical and theoretical literature on the macroeconomic ef-
fects of demography. Empirical studies tend to focus on a single variable of
interest, using 5-year average data and summarising demography by a single sta-
tistic (e.g. Higgins and Williamson (1997) and Bloom et al. (2007)), or using a
low order polynomials in the parameters (e.g. Fair and Dominguez (1991) and
Higgins (1998)). An exception is Favero and Galasso (2015) who use annual data
and population weights to estimate single equation econometric models. We use
annual data rather than 5-year averages, use a more granular representation of
the demographic structure and, having a larger sample, we can estimate a pa-
nel VAR rather than a single equation, thus allowing for interactions between
macro-variables that potentially capture general equilibrium effects.
On the theoretical side our paper is related to studies of the impact of de-
mographics on the macroeconomy and interest rates (e.g. Krueger and Ludwig
(2007), Carvalho et al. (2016) and Gagnon et al. (2016)). Our framework is
distinctive in incorporating demographic heterogeneity in an endogenous growth
model (following Romer (1990) and Comin and Gertler (2006)) and hence can
analyze how changes in demographic structure affects innovation, productivity
and growth. While comparing our projected impact of demographic changes in
the next decades with the projections shown in Gagnon et al. (2016), we find
that the link between demographics and productivity amplifies the effects of po-
pulation changes on the interest rate. Finally, our work is also related to the
Alvin Hanson’s recently popularised argument on whether mature economies are
experiencing a long lasting stagnation due to permanently low demand. Most of
this literature currently focuses on the effects of aggregate demand externalities
in periods of financial deleveraging that may lead to prolonged periods of lower
real rates of return (see Eggertsson and Mehrotra (2014) and Jimeno (2015)). By
linking demographic changes to innovation and output growth, our results provide
further indication that OECD economies are more likely to experience episodes
where aggregate demand externalities together with supply side channels may
lead to stagnation in the following decades.
The remainder of the paper is organised as follows. The econometric metho-
dology is presented in Section I and the empirical results in Section II. The
theoretical framework is presented in Section III and the simulation results in
Section IV. Finally, Section V concludes.
I. Econometric model
We wish to discover the long-run impact of changes in the demographic struc-
ture, represented by a set of population shares Wt, on a set of macroeconomic
variables, Yt. The dynamic interactions among these economic variables are li-
kely to be complicated. In Section III we present a theoretical general equilibrium
model that allows for a range of these interactions, which we calibrate in terms of
the deep parameters of the system. In principle, one might consider estimating
a linearised version of this structural system. Identifying and directly estimating
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such a system is likely to be difficult. Therefore we estimate a reduced form of the
system and assume that conditional on the exogenous variables, it can be written
as a VAR. We then compare the simulated predictions from our theoretical model
of Section III with the predictions of the estimated empirical model.
In the Panel VAR we have a vector of macroeconomic variables Yit and of
population shares Wit for countries i = 1, 2, ..., N. We assume slope homogeneity
across countries. While slope heterogeneity is undoubtedly important, we found
that estimating heterogeneous slopes with relatively few degrees of freedom re-
sulted in poorly determined parameters. Baltagi et al. (2000) show that the
homogeneous estimators tend to have better forecasting properties. As a result,
since our main aim is prediction, we assume slope homogeneity, but allow for
intercept heterogeneity through ai. Relying on the Schwarz Bayesian information
criterion (SBC) a one-way fixed effect model with country intercepts was pre-
ferred for every equation to a two-way fixed effect model with country and year
intercepts (two-way estimation results are discussed in the robustness section).
The SBC of a first and second order VAR were similar and thus we select the
more parsimonious model. Therefore, we estimate an augmented panel VARX(1)
of the form:2
(1) Yit = ai +AYi,t−1 +DWit + uit,
including two additional controls: lagged oil price, to allow for global shocks, and
population growth, to capture the effects of demographic structure (Wit) rather
than the population effect.3
The panel variability is crucial for the identification of the impact of demogra-
phics. The fixed effect (or within) estimator can be written in terms of deviations
from the country means of the variables, so does not use the cross section (between
country) variation. However, it benefits from the greater within variation that
results from different countries entering the demographic transition at different
times.
Having estimated ai, A and D, from the panel VAR, the long-run equilibrium
for the system (ignoring population growth and oil prices) is then given by
(2) Y∗it = (I−A)−1 ai + (I−A)−1DWit,
2The demographic variables show very low frequency variation relative to annual macroeconomic time-
series and thus are assumed to be exogenous. A VARX with Wit considered exogenous is appropriate
whenYi,t−1 do not Granger-causeWit. We confirm the VARX specification in equation (1) is applicable,
see Section II.A for details.
3Implicitly we are assuming either that all the variables are stationary or that a flexible unrestricted
VAR will capture stationary combinations by differencing or cointegrating linear combinations. Phillips
and Moon (1999) and Coakley et al. (2006) suggest that spurious regression may be less of a problem in
panels. Notice that we do not attempt to determine how A and D relate to structural (deep) parameters.
Our primary empirical objective is to provide predictions of the long-run effect of the demographic
variables and the same predictions would be obtained from any just identified structural model.
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where the effect of the demographic variables is given by DLR = (I−A)−1D,
which reflects both the direct effect of demographics on each variable and the
feedback between the endogenous variables. Therefore, we can consider the effects
of demography on savings to influence growth through the effect of savings on
growth. We can isolate the long-run contribution of demography to each variable
in each country by obtaining the demographic attractor for the economic variables
at any moment in time
(3) YDit = (I−A)−1DWit = DLRWit.
We denote each element in matrix DLR, which is a function of parameters in
matrices A and D, dij(A,D). In order to test whether each element or a sum of
those elements in DLR are significantly different from zero (e.g. H0 : DLR(i, j) = 0
or H0 : dij(A,D) = 0) we utilize a non-linear Wald test.
4 Finally, it is important
to distinguish between our long-run estimate and a long-run steady state. Our
estimates provide a long-run forecast for the economic variables conditional on a
particular vector of demographic shares after the completion of the endogenous
adjustment of the economic variables and as such we are measuring the impact
of demographics on the long-run trend of the key macroeconomic variables. Ho-
wever, as time passes the demographic structure might evolve towards a steady
state demographic distribution. We do not model this process and thus are not
providing explicitly an estimate of the effects of any demographic convergence to
a steady state on the macroeconomy. Nonetheless, the UN projections used in
our prediction exercise may embody some estimate of such convergence.
Our benchmark specification includes six endogenous variables: the growth rate
of the real GDP, git; the share of investment in GDP, Iit; the share of personal
savings in GDP, Sit; the logarithms of hours worked per capita, Hit; the real
short-term interest rate, rrit; and the rate of inflation, piit. We denote the vector
of these six variables as Yit = (git, Iit, Sit, Hit, rrit, piit)
′. Lack of growth and
investment, excess savings, reductions in labour supply and interest rates have all
commonly been implicated in the secular stagnation debate and thus their inclu-
sion is straightforward. The case for including inflation in a longer run model is
less clear. But since our methodology relies on estimating the dynamic interac-
tions among the macro variables where monetary policy is an active stabilisation
tool, we include inflation to allow for these feedbacks. We discuss a series of
alternative specifications, including a model without inflation, replacing output
growth with per capita growth, replacing short-term with long-term interest rates
and including net foreign assets. The main results of the benchmark specification
4The Wald statistic is given by dij(Aˆ, Dˆ)
T [d′ij(Aˆ, Dˆ)(Vˆ(A,D))d
′
ij(Aˆ, Dˆ)
T ]−1dij(Aˆ, Dˆ)
D−→ χ2Q,
where Vˆ(A,D) is the estimated variance-covariance matrix and d′ij(Aˆ, Dˆ) is the gradient of function
dij(Aˆ, Dˆ).
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are robust to these variations.5
We represent the age structure by the population shares of three groups: the
young dependants, aged below 20; the working age population, aged 20 to 60; and
the old dependants, aged 60 and over. We denote the share of age group j = 1, 2, 3
(0 − 19, 20 − 59, 60+) in total population by wjit. Since
∑3
j=1wjit = 1, there is
exact collinearity if all the demographic shares are included. To deal with this, we
restrict the coefficients to sum to 0, use (wjit−w3it) as explanatory variables and
recover the coefficient of the oldest age group from δ3 = −
∑2
j=1 δj . We denote
the 2 element vector of (wjit − w3it) as Wit. This demographic representation
is parsimonious and effectively reflect both the young and old dependency ratios
often used in empirical studies on demographics.
We also consider a specification with 8 age groups (0 − 9, 10 − 19, . . . , 70+).
Although a richer relationship between demographics and the macroeconomy is
uncovered with a more granular representation of the age structure, the results
confirm a strong pattern differentiating young dependants, workers and the old,
supporting our benchmark model. Moreover, since our theoretical model has the
same age groups (youngsters, workers and retirees), the three group specification
provides a closer link between theory and empirics.
II. Estimation Results
The annual dataset covers the period 1970-2014 for 21 OECD countries (see
the online appendix for details). Population data were obtained from the World
Population Prospects, the 2015 Revision (United Nations (2016)). Age composi-
tions are calculated using the share of the de facto population in the age group
indicated in the total population. It is important to note that UN population
data measures those living in a country, not just its citizens, thus reflecting immi-
gration. We complement this with annual data on savings and investment rates,
calculated from nominal GDP, hours worked, annual data on policy rates and
the Consumer Price Index (CPI). Finally, real output growth rates are calculated
from real GDP.
Table 1 shows our main parameter of interest, the (I−A)−1D = DLR matrix:
the long-term demographic effects for three age groups (β’s).6 We observe clear
life-cycle patterns: workers contribute positively to growth, investment, savings,
5In Section II.B. we extend our model with an additional variable, per capita patent applications,
a proxy for innovation. However our benchmark econometric specification involves a trade-off between
efficiency (precision of estimates) and bias (6 variables system against 7 variables system). Therefore,
we start with the six variable model since the bias caused by the omitted variable, per capita patent
applications, is very small, and we gain in terms of efficiency since the parameters are more precisely
estimated.
6Full estimates with robust standard errors of matrices A and D are shown in the online appendix.
We note that hours worked, investment, savings and real rates are highly persistent and real output and
inflation rate are moderately so. Granger causality tests suggest that all our endogenous variables are
Granger causal (with two lags) for most of the other variables in the system; so we seem to be capturing
the dynamic interactions between the main economic variables. The residual correlation matrix shows
some strong contemporaneous correlations, possibly reflecting business cycle effects.
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hours worked and interest rates and dependants, the old particularly, contribute
negatively. Allowing for the dynamics and interactions strengthens the general
impact of demographics; the long-run effects are much larger than the short-term
effects. While in principle, statistical significance for each parameter is difficult to
obtain given that each element in DLR is a function of 38 estimated parameters
(matrix A and a column of matrix D), most of the long term demographic struc-
ture parameters are precisely estimated. (11 out of 18 parameters). Furthermore,
the joint test that β2, β3 = 0 is strongly rejected for all equations.
β1 β2 β3
g 0.04 0.06 -0.10
(0.15) (0.28) (0.04)
I 0.13 0.08 -0.22
(0.01) (0.48) (0.02)
S 0.24 0.16 -0.40
(0.00) (0.29) (0.00)
H -0.54 1.08 -0.54
(0.00) (0.00) (0.05)
rr -0.05 0.46 -0.42
(0.72) (0.15) (0.10)
pi 0.70 -0.75 0.05
(0.00) (0.00) (0.68)
Note: The p-values of the non-linear
Wald Test (See footnote 4) with H0 :
DLR(i, j) = 0 is reported within brackets.
Table 1—Long-Run Demographic Impact Matrix - DLR
Although the estimates indicate clear differences in the effect of different age
groups on the macro variables, we are also interested in the net effects of de-
mographic changes. To measure these we use the demographic predictions for
each county (Wi,t+h) from the UN World Population Prospects, 2015 Revision,
and our long-run demographic impact matrix (DLR) to estimate the effect of
expected demographic changes on the long-run macro trends (see equation (3)).
Formally, we obtain Yi,t+h = DLR(Wi,t+h−Wi,t) +Yi,t. Table 2 provides these
conditional forecasts that incorporate the changes in demographic structure on
average annual GDP growth (in percentage points). The first column shows the
mean growth rate between 1970-2010 for each country (initial value at time t
- Yi,t). The second (third) column shows the projected long-run growth rate
in 2015 (2025) incorporating the effects of demographic changes from 2010-2014
(2010-2024). The results suggest that in all countries in our sample, demographic
changes over this decade depress long-term GDP growth. The magnitude of the
drop is highly economically significant: for the US, for example, it is 0.65 percen-
tage points and for Japan 0.42. The last column of Table 2 shows the probability
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that the change in GDP growth, as a result of demographic changes, would be
negative. This is less than 10 percent for all countries except for Sweden.
Whereas demography is quite predictable, being largely predetermined by known
birth and death rates, economic variables are less so. Unrestricted VARs tend to
have poor unconditional forecasting records, because they are over-parameterised,
hence the widespread use of Bayesian VARs. Here we are using the VAR not to
make a forecast but to make a conditional prediction of the effect of likely de-
mographic change. We may not know what growth will be in 2025, but the
estimates suggest that it will be lower than it would have been had the demogra-
phic structure not changed in the way the UN expects. In addition, VAR’s have
been criticised for attributing implausibly large parts of the low frequency varia-
tion to deterministic components, (e.g. Giannone et al. (2017)) but here the low
frequency drivers are the predictable exogenous changes in demographic struc-
ture. Finally, our conditional predictions do not take into account other possible
counter balancing factors that drive long term trends, for instance technological
progress associated with recent developments in robotics (Acemog˘lu and Restrepo
(2017)).
Sample Average Projected at Projected at Change (∆g)
(1970-2010) 2015 2025 (2015-2025) Prob(∆g > 0)
Australia 3.33 3.11 2.60 -0.51 0.089
Austria 2.51 2.37 1.53 -0.84 0.080
Belgium 2.57 2.45 1.88 -0.57 0.087
Canada 3.05 2.69 1.81 -0.88 0.080
Denmark 2.18 1.97 1.50 -0.46 0.060
Finland 2.80 2.44 1.93 -0.51 0.084
France 2.57 2.26 1.72 -0.54 0.068
Germany 2.11 1.91 1.15 -0.77 0.081
Greece 3.77 3.49 2.82 -0.67 0.061
Iceland 3.46 3.13 2.39 -0.74 0.065
Ireland 5.00 4.59 3.99 -0.61 0.068
Italy 2.91 2.64 1.84 -0.79 0.073
Japan 2.95 2.56 2.14 -0.42 0.069
Netherlands 3.01 2.68 1.90 -0.78 0.066
New Zealand 2.72 2.47 1.78 -0.69 0.066
Norway 3.63 3.53 3.10 -0.43 0.063
Portugal 3.69 3.33 2.58 -0.75 0.056
Spain 3.73 3.41 2.51 -0.90 0.073
Sweden 2.20 2.17 1.86 -0.31 0.119
Switzerland 2.22 2.13 1.40 -0.74 0.084
United Kingdom 2.60 2.47 1.96 -0.51 0.087
United States 2.85 2.53 1.87 -0.65 0.066
Table 2—Average Predicted Impact on GDP Growth (in percentage) by Country
We also present the projected effect of demographics on the trend of output
growth, real rates, investment and savings for France, Italy, Japan, and the Uni-
ted States (the prediction for four additional countries is shown in the online
appendix) for the period 2010 up until 2030 in Figure 2. As before, the initial
point in the year 2010 is given by the observed sample average of the variable
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for the period 1970-2010. Then at each year from 2011 to 2030 we depict the
conditional forecasts (Yi,t+k) for output growth, savings, investment and real
rates.7
We observe that demographic changes are expected to reduce long term growth
and real interest rate in all OECD countries in our sample in the next two decades.
Shaded areas (80 and 90 percent one sided tests) around conditional predictions
of the macroeconomic variables in our dynamic system show that our estimates
are reasonably precise; given the UN population projections all variables exhibit
clear downward trends. In 2030 there is a higher than 90 percent chance that
demographic changes lead to lower growth rates, investment and savings in all
countries and 85-90 percent chance that real interest rates decrease.
Demographic changes are projected to reduce on average the ratio of investment
over GDP by 2 percentage points, saving over GDP by 3 percentage points and
output growth by 1.25 percentage points across countries in the OECD. The
projections for real interest rate show a more substantiable fall. We note that
in some of our robustness exercises, for instance when mortality and fertility
trends are incorporated, the ageing effect on interest rate is dampened. In our
structural model we also find that the implied fall in interest rates due to the
predicted demographic changes is less pronounced. Therefore, we interpret the
results in the benchmark estimation as a lower bound on the projected path of
interest rates.
The depicted long term trends and their confidence bounds arise solely from
our demographic attractor estimates; there will still be uncertainty associated
with UN demographic predictions we do not account for and uncertainty coming
from shocks to endogenous variables in the system, and hence the projections
should not be interpreted as a general forecast. Nevertheless, our results show a
strong positive association between real output growth, real rates and crucially
investment rates, suggesting the secular stagnation hypothesis - the decline in
real rates and real output - must be related to aggregate supply drivers and not
only to aggregate demand externalities.
Finally, we perform a projection exercise focusing on the in sample period. We
compare a prediction using our parameter estimates and the actual population
changes from 1980 to 2015 with the long-term trends extracted from the data.
We utilize a band pass filter that removes short and medium-term cycles (with
frequency from 1 to 35 years) from the raw data.8 This should not be interpreted
as a validation test of our empirical model since there are several factors that
could be affecting long-term trends together with demographics. However, the
analysis offers an insight as to whether demographics is a relevant driver of these
7The first row of Figure 2 is effectively a graphical representation of the results of the conditional
forecasts of output displayed in Table 2. For instance, in the case of the United States (top right corner),
the initial point in 2010 is 2.85 percent, and in 2025, output growth is expected to fall to 1.87 percent.
8Comin and Gertler (2006) define short-term cycles for frequencies of up to 8 years and medium-term
cycles for the movements at frequencies from 8 to 50 years. Given the length of our time series we restrict
medium-term cycles to 35 years.
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Figure 2. Impact of Predicted Future Demographic Structure
trends. We find that the long-term projections based on demographic changes are
well aligned with the observed trends across variables and countries, particularly
being able to match the hump-shaped path of interest rates due to the effects of
the baby-boomers; first entering the labour force in the 70’s and 80’s, pushing
rates up, and having the opposite effect when approaching retirement.9 We also
infer that the decreasing trends in investment and savings are influenced by age
structure changes. Results are displayed in Figure 3.
A. Robustness
We analyse the robustness of our results by altering the benchmark model in
various ways. Here we summarise them, all detailed results are given in the online
appendix.10
First we varied the exogenous controls. Our benchmark specification includes
9In Aksoy et al. (2015) we look at the effect of increasing fertility for a decade and tracing the
economy’s response as the entire demographic structure converges back to its starting point both in
the theoretical and empirical models. This hump-shaped responses are obtained in both cases. The
information content of demographics to explain interest rates is also stressed by Favero et al. (2016)
while looking at bond yields and excess returns.
10Aksoy et al. (2012) and Aksoy et al. (2015) estimate the model for the period up to the financial
crisis (1970-2007). Results are qualitatively invariant to the sample used.
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Figure 3. Demographics and Trends - In Sample Projection
population growth as an exogenous control, but this will reflect trends in fertility
and mortality rates. (See Favero and Galasso (2015) for a detailed discussion.) In
an alternative specification we replace population growth with mortality and fer-
tility rates calculated with the Lee and Carter (1992) procedure using age-specific
fertility and mortality data. Our benchmark results are robust. The main dif-
ference in this specification is the impacts of the 60+ age group on real interest
rates (β3 increases from −0.42 to 0). This effect in line with the results discussed
in Favero and Galasso (2015), who argue that controlling for mortality trends has
a positive effect on interest rates projections. Nonetheless, given that the interest
rate effect of the share of active population is strongly positive and significant, the
demographic changes expected for most OECD economies would still generate a
fall in interest rates. Under this specification the projected decrease in interest
rates would be milder than in the benchmark model.11 We conclude that varia-
11The coefficients of mortality and fertility are generally small and including them makes very little
difference to the projections. The 60+ age group embeds two opposing drivers of the effects of demogra-
phics on interest rates. First, the share of 60+ individuals increases due to high life expectancy, which is
responsible for pushing rates down. Second, the old tend to use up their savings pushing interest rates
up. Including mortality trends introduces a control for the life expectancy effect and thus the parameter
estimate of this age group reflects the second effect more strongly.
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tions in age structure reflect the two fundamental demographic shocks: fertility
and mortality.
The results are largely unchanged if oil prices, used to control for global shocks,
are removed. A more general control for global factors is to allow for time effects,
though the SBC chose the one-way, country fixed effect model. Comparing the
estimation results from the two way fixed effect model and the benchmark model
reveals that long-term demographic effects are generally robust, maintaining the
pattern of differentiation between workers and dependants. The relationship bet-
ween investment and demographics becomes more uncertain (β1 and β3 are no
longer significant). Nonetheless, ageing continues to lead to a drop in investment
as β2 > 0 is statistically different than β3 < 0. We also observe that the 60+ age
group no longer has a negative impact on real rates, similar to the specification
with mortality and fertility trends.
Second we varied the vector of dependent variables (Yit). The results are ro-
bust to excluding inflation, utilizing per capital output (gpc) instead of output
growth and using long-term (10 years) rates (rrlr) instead of short-term rates.
The benchmark model only includes domestic variables. We add net foreign as-
sets to GDP ratio (nfa) to the vector Yt to allow for international effects through
current account dynamics. Due to data availability (see Lane and Milesi-Ferretti
(2007)) the sample period is 1970-2011. Our current account proxy exhibits life
cycle properties. Although parameter estimates are imprecise, net foreign assets
to GDP are decreasing in working age population and increasing in young and
old age groups.12 Our long term estimates and the demographic impact signifi-
cance for other variables in the system are not qualitatively affected. Particularly,
interest rate estimations are not significantly altered and hence although capital
movements are driven by demographics, the presence of frictions might be pre-
venting interest rate equalization across countries, preserving the heterogeneity
in which our identification relies on.
Thirdly, we varied the demographic variables. Rather than three age groups we
used 8 age groups j = 1, 2, ..8 (0 − 9, 10 − 19, . . . , 70+) denoted wj,i,t and Wi,t
comprises the 7 element vector of (wj,i,t − w8,i,t). The general life cycle findings
are confirmed with more granular age structure. Increases in the older age groups
(60-69, 70+) are associated with reductions in all macroeconomic variables except
inflation while working age groups (20-29, 30-39, 40-49, 50-59) impact positively
on the macro variables other than inflation. Real rates are increased by the share
in age groups 10-19, 20-29 and 30-39 and reduced by older groups, supporting
our benchmark results. As more parameter estimates are needed, significance of
each group effect is compromised. As demographic patterns affect the entire age
structure, we also conduct joint significance test of the parameters for workers,
dependants and their difference. Results confirm the life cycle pattern in the
relationship between demographics and macroeconomic variables, suggesting that
the parsimonious representation used in the benchmark model is preferable.
12The link between demographics and capital flows are also studied by Ferrero (2010).
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Fourthly, we test for the weak exogeneity of Wit (that is equivalent to check
whether our set of macroeconomic variables does not Granger-cause the demo-
graphic structure). Although we find that the lags of some the macro variables
significantly affect Wit, the estimated parameters were all small. For instance,
the highest significant parameter estimate is 0.02, measuring the impact of the
saving rate on the relative share of the young age group (0-19). That implies a one
percentage point move in saving rates would lead to a change in that proportion
from 10 to 10.02 percent in the short-run. We thus conclude that Yi,t−1 do not
significantly (economically) affect Wit. Demographics can therefore be included
as an exogenous variable in the dynamic model of Yi,t, as our benchmark VARX
prescribes.
B. Demographics and Innovation
Our estimates indicate that ageing reduces growth, investment, and interest
rates, suggesting that demographics influence aggregate supply. This accords with
the literature. Kuznets (1960) discusses the relevance of population growth, and
hence the presence of the young, for innovation. Feyrer (2007, 2008 and 2011) find
a strong relationship between demographic structure and productivity, suggesting
two potential channels: innovation and adoption of ideas through managerial and
entrepreneurial activity. He shows that in the US innovators’ median age is stable
around 48 over the 1975-95 sample period whereas median age of managers who
adopt ideas is even lower. He argues that changes in the supply of workers may
have an impact on the innovation rate. Similarly, Jones (2010) and Jones et al.
(2014) consider the age distribution of scientists (Nobel Prize winners and great
technological innovators) and development of ground-breaking ideas. They argue
that the scientific or technological breakthroughs peak when scientists are in their
late 30’s.
In order to account for possible dynamic interactions between demographic
structure and innovation which in turn affect technological progress and aggregate
supply, we re-estimate the model including an additional variable that proxies for
R&D activity. We utilize the log number of residential patent applications per
capita, (R&DPA, see World Development Indictors - World Bank). Thus, the
vector of endogenous variables is now given by Yi,t = (gi,t, Ii,t, Si,t, Hi,t, rri,t,
R&DPAi,t , pii,t).
Table 3 shows the estimated long-term demographic impact matrix DLR =
(I−A)−1D. The introduction of innovation variable does not affect the main
qualitative conclusions obtained in the benchmark estimation. Furthermore, we
find that young and old have a negative effect on patenting whereas workers
contribute positively. Using eight age groups confirms that the positive effect
is concentrated in young and middle-aged workers, in line with the evidence in
Jones (2010) and Feyrer (2008). Finally, using these long-term estimates and UN
population predictions we find that the expected ageing in the next two decades
may lead to a drop in per capita patent applications of 15 to 30 percent in our
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β1 β2 β3
g 0.02 0.07 -0.09
(0.52) (0.26) (0.09)
I 0.15 0.05 -0.20
(0.02) (0.74) (0.06)
S 0.24 0.22 -0.45
(0.01) (0.20) (0.00)
H -0.48 0.95 -0.47
(0.02) (0.02) (0.15)
rr -0.12 0.53 -0.42
(0.47) (0.12) (0.10)
R&DPA -3.70 4.50 -0.80
(0.00) (0.03) (0.60)
pi 0.72 -0.81 0.08
(0.00) (0.00) (0.52)
Note: The p-values of the non-linear
Wald Test (See footnote 4) with H0 :
DLR(i, j) = 0 is reported within brackets.
Table 3—Long-Run Demographic Impact - Innovation
sample of OECD countries.
III. Theoretical Model
In this section we propose a model which allows for demographic heterogeneity,
life-cycle properties, innovation and endogenous productivity.
The economy consists of three sectors: production, innovation and households.
The production sector comprises of a final good producer, whose inputs are diffe-
rentiated goods provided by producers, who employ capital, labour and a compo-
site intermediate good. The number of input producers is endogenous, determined
through entry and exit.
The intermediate good aggregates an endogenous set of product varieties, crea-
ted by a two stage innovation process involving product creation of prototypes
through R&D and product adoption, converting the prototypes into intermediate
goods.
Individuals, in the households sector, supply labour, accumulate assets and
consume over their life-cycle. Finally, a zero expected profit financial intermediary
facilitates the allocation of assets between the household and the production and
innovation sectors.
A. Production
The final good producer combines inputs from Nft firms, denoted by superscript
j. Total output is thus given by
(4) Yc,t =
[∫ Nft
0
(Y jc,t)
(1/µt)dj
]µt
,
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where µt denotes the mark-up of input firms. We assume µt = µ(N
f
t ), µ
′(·) < 0
and that profits of intermediate good firms Π(µt, Y
j
c,t) must equate operating costs
given by ΩΨ˜t, where Ψ˜t is a scaling factor defined to ensure we obtain a balanced
growth path (see below).
Each firm j produces a specialised good using capital (Kjt ), labour (L
j
t ) and an
intermediate composite good (M jt ). Production is given by
(5) Y jc,t =
[
(U jtK
j
t )
α(ξtL
j
t )
(1−α)
](1−γI) [
M jt
]γI
,
where U jt is the utilisation rate, γI the intermediate good share, ξtLt denotes the
effective labour units employed in production and α the capital share of added
value. The intermediate composite good used by firm j aggregates At specialised
goods such that
(6) M jt =
[∫ At
0
(M jit )
(1/ϑ)di
]ϑ
.
Each producer of specialized good i acquires the right to market this good via
the creation and adoption process. Total costs of production for firm j are then
given by
(7) TCjt = WtξtL
j
t + (r
k
t + δ(U
j
t ))K
j
t + P
M
t M
j
t
where Wt is the wage, ξt is the average effective unit of labour, r
k
t is the rent of
capital, δ(U jt ) is the capital depreciation rate, with δ
′(·) > 0, and PMt is the price
of the intermediate composite good.
Firms’ optimization conditions determine the equilibrium wage, the rent of
capital, the utilisation rate, the intermediate good composite and their price, the
number of firms (through the entry condition), the mark-up and the depreciation
rate. In equilibrium, the total production of final goods is given by
(8) Yc,t = (N
f
t )
µt−1
[
(Ut
Kt
ξtLt
)α(ξtLt)
](1−γI)
[Mt]
γI .
This condition embeds the two key assumptions that shape the dynamic responses
in the production sector. Firstly, given that the mark-up µt is greater than
one, as Nft increases total production increases. Secondly, the intermediate good
composite Mt increases with the number of varieties At and the number of input
producers Nft . Thus, variations in aggregate supply may occur due to innovation
effort determining the number of varieties At, which we look at closely next, and
the incentives for entry, which is directly related to the level of aggregate demand.
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B. R&D and Adoption
Innovation in intermediate good varieties is divided into two stages: R&D which
invents prototypes and adoption which converts them into intermediate goods.
This two step innovation process captures the lags between invention and adop-
tion observed in practice, see Comin and Gertler (2006), and is quantitatively
important for our results.
Let Zpt be the stock of prototypes for innovator p, who at each period spends
Spt to invent ϕtS
p
t new prototypes. Thus, Z
p
t+1 is given by
(9) Zpt+1 = ϕtS
p
t + φZ
p
t ,
where φ is the product survival rate. In Comin and Gertler (2006) the productivity
of new inventions ϕt is assumed to be given by ϕ
CG
t = χZt[Ψ˜
ρ
t (St)
1−ρ]−1, where χ
is a scale parameter. Thus, it depends on the aggregate stock of prototypes (Zt),
such that there is a positive spillover as in Romer (1990), and on a congestion
externality via the factor [Ψ˜ρt (St)
1−ρ]−1, such that a balanced growth path exists
and the R&D elasticity of new technology creation in equilibrium is ρ. However,
as Kremer (1993) discusses if each individual’s chance of being lucky or smart
enough to invent something is independent of population size, then the number of
individuals working relative to total population will be important to determine the
aggregate growth rate of invented goods in an economy. Jones (2010), Jones et al.
(2014) and Feyrer (2008) analyse the age profile of inventors/innovators and show
that the frequency of inventions of middle-age individuals is substantially higher
than the one observed for younger and older individuals. Derrien et al. (2017),
exploiting the heterogeneity across regions in the US, show that a younger labour
force innovates more. Finally, our estimates indicate that economies with a greater
share of middle-age workers (30-49) generate more patents while economies with
more dependants produce less patents.13 Consequently, innovation may be related
to the demographic composition of the economy.
To reflect the role of demographics in innovation, we assume the productivity of
invention is given by ϕt ≡ (Γywt )ρywχZt[Ψ˜ρt (St)1−ρNρywt ]−1, where Γywt is the stock
of workers in the innovation sector and ρyw controls their importance, which we
calibrate using the data in Jones (2010) relating the production of ideas to age.
As discussed in Jones (1995) and more recently Bloom et al. (2017), models of
endogenous growth where an increase in the growth rate of the stock of workers
employed in R&D (due to population growth) generates faster steady state output
growth are inconsistent with the data. In order to avoid such feature and to ensure
we obtain a balanced growth path, we include a measure of total population (Nt)
in the congestion factor (as a robustness, we also consider a congestion measure
13Liang et al. (2014), looking at entrepreneurship show that a high proportion of old workers prevents
young workers gaining the necessary knowledge to start up a new business, thus reducing entrepreneur-
ship.
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using the working age population - Nwt ). If ρyw = 0, the innovation process is
equivalent to the one assumed in Comin and Gertler (2006). If ρyw > 0, an
economy that employs more of its young workers in research and development
innovates more. We define Γywt when we discuss the population dynamics below.
The stock of prototypes is then
(10) Zpt+1 = (Γ
yw
t )
ρywχZt[(Ψ˜t)
ρ(St)
1−ρNρywt ]
−1Spt + φZ
p
t .
We assume that innovators borrow Spt from the financial intermediary. Define
Jt as the value of a prototype, then, innovator p will invest S
p
t until the marginal
cost equates the expected gain. Thus,
(11) φE[Jt+1] =
Rt+1
ϕt
.
Where Rt+1 is the interest rate.
Adopters (q) obtain the rights to the technology from inventors and make an
investment of Ξt to transform Z
q
t into A
q
t , defined as the stock of converted goods
ready to be sold to firms. This conversion process succeeds with probability
λt = λ
(
Aqt
Ψ˜t
Ξt
)
and λ′(·) > 0; thus more investment yields more adoptions. If
unsuccessful, the good remains a prototype. Once converted it can be sold to
firms with value
(12) Vt = Πm,t + (Rt+1)
−1φEtVt+1,
where Πm,t = (1 − 1/ϑ)γI Yc,tµtAt is the profit from selling an intermediate good to
input firms. The value of a prototype is then
(13) Jt = max
Ξt
−Ξt + (Rt+1)−1φEt[λtVt+1 + (1− λt)Jt+1].
The stock of prototypes at t is (Zqt −Aqt ). Thus,
(14) Aqt+1 = λtφ(Z
q
t −Aqt ) + φAqt .
The expenditure in consumption goods of adopters, financed by borrowing, is
Ξt(Z
q
t −Aqt ).
Conditions (11), (12) and (13) highlight the drivers of innovation. Firstly, as
aggregate demand increases, the profit from selling new varieties (Πm,t) increases
and thus Vt also increases leading to a more successful rate of adoptions (higher
λt). Consequently, holding productivity (ϕt) constant, the value of prototypes Jt
increases, boosting the investment in product creation. Secondly, as the interest
rate decreases, both the value of adopted goods Vt and prototypes Jt increase
since these depend on future gains that are less heavily discounted. Finally,
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the productivity of prototype creation (ϕt) is directly related to the share of
young workers, and thus, demographic structure ultimately affects the evolution
of the number of varieties (At). Finally, allowing for the lag between adoption
and invention is important. If we set Jt = Vt, ignoring adoption, the impact of
demographic changes is faster and more volatile than shown in the data.
C. Household Sector
There is a continuum of agents of mass Nt, divided amongst 3 age groups:
young dependants (Nyt ), workers (N
w
t ), and retirees (N
r
t ). n˜t,t+1N
y
t individuals
are born every period and become workers with probability 1 − ωy. Workers
retire with a probability 1 − ωw, and retirees die and leave the economy with a
probability 1− ωrt,t+1. As a result, the population dynamics are
Nyt+1 = n˜t,t+1N
y
t + ω
yNyt = (n˜t,t+1 + ω
y)Nyt = nt,t+1N
y
t ,(15)
Nwt+1 = (1− ωy)Nyt + ωwNwt ,(16)
N rt+1 = (1− ωw)Nwt + ωrt,t+1N rt .(17)
The young dependency ratio is ζyt ≡ Nyt /Nwt and the old dependency ratio is
ζrt ≡ N rt /Nwt . The stock of workers (Γywt ) who influence the innovation process is
(18) Γywt ≡ κy(1− ωy)Nyt + (1− λywωw)Γywt−1,
where κy denotes the share of new workers at period t who participate in inno-
vation, and 0 < λywωw ≤ 1 denotes the fraction of workers who retire or are
no longer active in the innovation sector. As such the average working life of a
worker who joins the innovation sector is 1/(λywωw). We denote γywt = Γ
yw
t /Nt
the share of innovation workers.
The dependent young passively acquire human capital, while workers and re-
tirees decide their consumption to maximise welfare. As in Gertler (1999), we
make two key assumptions to simplify the model such that household decision
rules aggregate linearly. An individual faces two idiosyncratic risks: loss of wage
income at retirement and time of death. There is a perfect annuity market al-
lowing retirees to insure against time of death. They turn their wealth over to
perfectly competitive financial intermediaries which invest the proceeds and pay
back a return of Rt/ω
r
t−1,t for surviving retirees.
The uncertainty about the employment tenure does not affect workers since they
are assumed to be risk-neutral. To provide a motive for consumption smoothing,
we assume that individual preferences belong to the recursive non-expected utility
family. Thus, for z = {w, r} we assume that the agent j selects consumption and
asset holdings to maximise
(19) V jzt =
{
(Cjz)ρU + βzt,t+1(Et[V
j
t+1 | z]ρU )
}1/ρU
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subject to
(20) Cjzt + FA
jz
t+1 = R
z
tFA
jz
t +Wtξ
j
t I
z + dzt − τ jzt Iz
where βzt,t+1 is the discount factor, which is equal to β for workers and βω
r
t,t+1 for
retirees, Rzt is the return on assets, which is equal to Rt for workers and Rt/ω
r
t−1,t
for retirees. Wt is the wage, ξ
j
t is the effective unit of labour supplied by worker
j, and Iz is an indicator function that takes the value of one when z = w and
zero otherwise; thus we assume retirees do not work and workers’ labour supply
is fixed. FAjzt are the assets acquired from the financial intermediary and d
z
t is
the dividend from the financial intermediary. Finally, τ jzt is the tax a worker j
pays to support the young with the total transfer at time t given by τt =
∫ Nwt
0 τ
jz
t .
The consumption functions of workers and retirees, are
Cwt = ςt[RtFA
w
t +H
w
t +D
w
t − Twt ] and(21)
Crt = εtςt[RtFA
r
t +D
r
t ],(22)
where, Hwt is the present value of gains from human capital, T
w
t is the present
value of transfers, Dzt is the present value of dividends for z = {w, r}. ςt denotes
the marginal propensity of consumption of workers and εtςt for retirees (where
εt > 1). Given different marginal propensities the distribution of asset holdings
affect aggregate demand and the marginal propensities are functions of fertility
(n˜t,t+1) and longevity (ω
r
t,t+1) and are directly linked to the expected path of
interest rates. As such, variations in population dynamics and interest rates affect
aggregate demand and this effect may depend on the demographic composition
in the economy.
Society taxes workers to provide for the young and their education, which in-
creases the effective labour units they supply when they become workers. The
amount of investment in education (Iyt ) at each period is determined by equating
the marginal cost of obtaining resources from current workers (depressing their
consumption at t) and the marginal benefits of higher effective labour supply,
which leads to higher life cycle consumption. The greater the young dependency
ratio, ζyt , the greater the burden on the current generation of workers to finance
education, depressing investment in it. In contrast, lower fertility boosts edu-
cation. Ludwig et al. (2012) show this adjustment mechanism is important to
account for the effects of the demographic transitions on the macroeconomy.
Let ξt be the average effective units, or productivity, at period t. Each young
person who becomes a worker at the end of period t provides ξyt+1 effective units.
We assume
(23) ξyt+1 = ρEξt +
χE
2
(
Iyt
ξt
)2
ξt,
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where ρE < 1 and denotes the obsolescence of labour skills and I
y
t =
τt
WtNwt
is
the effective expenditure on the young, the ratio between total funds and their
labour cost. The evolution of workers effective labour units is then given by
ξt+1 = ω
w N
w
t
Nwt+1
ξt + (1− ωy) N
y
t
Nwt+1
ξyt+1.(24)
D. Financial Intermediary
The financial intermediary sells assets to the households (FAwt , FA
r
t ), holds
the capital (Kt) and rents it to firms and lends funds (Bt+1) to innovators and
adopters to finance their expenditure (given by St and Ξt(Zt−At), respectively).
Finally, we assume it owns the innovators and adopters enterprises, receiving their
dividends at the end of the period.
E. Equilibrium
The symmetric equilibrium is a tuple of endogenous predetermined variables
{FAzt+1, Kt+1, At+1, Zt+1, Bt+1, ξt+1} and a tuple of endogenous variables {Czt ,
Hwt , T
w
t , d
z
t , D
z
t , Lt, Yt, Ξt, µt, N
f
t , St, Vt, Jt, λt, Yc,t, Ct, Ut, r
k
t , δt, Rt, Π
F
t , Wt,
PMt , εt, τt, I
y
t , ξ
y
t+1 ςt} for z = {w, r} obtained such that: a. Workers and retirees
maximize utility subject to their budget constraint and investment in education
is such that society’s marginal cost and benefit is equated; b. Input and final firms
maximize profits, and firm entry occurs until profits are equal to operating costs;
c. Innovators and adopters maximise their gains; d. The financial intermediary
selects assets to maximize profits, and its profits are shared amongst retirees and
workers according to their share of assets; and e. Consumption goods, capital,
labour and asset markets clear.
All agents take as given the initial values of all the predetermined variables
{FAzt , Kt, At, Zt, ξt, FAt, Bt} and the exogenous predetermined variables {Nyt ,
Nwt , N
r
t , Nt} specified by the population dynamics. Details of all the equilibrium
conditions are shown in the online appendix. The market clearing equilibrium
conditions determine the labour used in production, the dynamics of the capital
stock, aggregate consumption, added value output from supply and demand sides
and finally the asset market flows for retirees and workers. Under these conditions,
the added value output is given by
(25) Yt = Yc,t −A1−ϑt Mt − ΩΨ˜t = Ct + It + St + Ξt(Zt −At) + τt
We must then define Ψ˜t such that a balanced growth path exists. Comin and
Gertler (2006) select the current value of capital stock. Given that in their model
the price of capital is determined at time t, Ψ˜t fluctuates accordingly ensuring
stability. We simplify our model to consider only one sector and thus the price
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of capital and the value of the capital stock are constant at t, invalidating this
choice of scaling factor. We therefore select the current value of adopted goods
as our scaling factor. Thus,
(26) Ψ˜t ≡ VtAt.
F. Calibration and Steady State
The quantity variables of our model are driven by: the exogenously given ferti-
lity rate (n˜), the endogenous growth of effective labour (ξt) and the endogenous
process of invention and adoption of new intermediate goods (At), which increases
the productivity of capital and labour. We normalize certain variables relative
to final goods output to obtain a system of equations for the stationary steady
state. Throughout the calibration, we set one period of the model to correspond
to one year.
Individuals are young for 20 years on average, with the probability of becoming
a worker (1−ωy)=0.05. They work on average from 21 to 60, with the probability
of retirement (1-ωr)=0.025, and are retired on average from 61 until 70, and thus
ωr=0.9. At steady state, the ratio of young to workers is 70 percent, the ratio of
retirees to workers, 22 percent and retirees hold around 17 percent of the assets.
The measure of workers in innovation (γyw) depends on κy, which is set such that
γyw matches the share of R&D workers in US population, and λy, set to make
the average age of innovation workers to be 40 (slightly lower than the average
age of employed scientists reported in the Survey of Doctorate Recipients (SDR)
of the National Science Foundation - 2013).
For the parameters that govern the innovation process, we follow Comin and
Gertler (2006) closely. We set obsolescence (φ) and productivity in innovation
(χ) so growth per working age person is 0.024 and share of research expenditures
in total GDP is 0.012. The mark-up for intermediate goods is 1.6. The elasticity
of intermediate goods with respect to R&D (ρ) is 0.9. Average adoption time is
10 years thus λ = 0.1. The elasticity of this rate to increasing intensity (λ) is set
to 0.9. The price mark-up elasticity to entry (µ) is 1.
The link between demographics and innovation depends on the total share of
workers in innovation, parameter γyw, and the elasticity of invention to the share
of workers, parameter ρyw. Denote the share of innovation workers of each age
j ≥ 20 as Sγ,j , and thus
∑
j Sγ,j = γ
yw. We use the age distribution of inventions
from Jones (2010) to set the productivity of a worker of each age relative to a 20
year old worker, denoted Φj . In Jones (2010), the frequency of great inventions
of 38 years old workers is 0.042 while the frequency for 20 year old workers is
0.002 and hence 38 year old workers are roughly 21 times more productive than
their 20 year old counterparts. Both of these variables are depicted in Figure 4.
The reduced-form innovation framework in the model relates a single population
measure, γyw, and its elasticity, to the production of ideas. In order to reflect
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the information on the entire distribution of invention across ages we use each
age share (Sγ,j) and its respective productivity measure Φj to obtain an economy
wide productivity measure ρyw (which refers to our population measure, γ
yw).
Thus, we set ρyw such that
∑
j S
Φj
γ,j = (γ
yw
t )
ρyw+1. We use ρyw + 1 since Φj
denotes a relative productivity. As a result, were the probability that a worker
invents a new prototype independent of age and Φj = 1 for all j, then ρyw = 0 and
innovation is not influenced by the economy’s demographic composition or age
profile. Our calibration reflects the fact that demographic composition matters,
the middle aged are more productive, and ρyw = 0.51.
Figure 4. Age Distribution of Ideas and Share of Workers in Innovation
Finally we set the standard macro parameters, in line with Comin and Gertler
(2006)). The discount factor β= 0.96; the capital share α = 0.33; steady state
capital utilisation U¯ = 80 percent; the yearly depreciation rate δ(U¯) = 0.08; the
elasticity of the change in the depreciation rate with respect to utilisation is 0.33;
the share of intermediate goods γI = 0.5; and the mark-up in the consumption
sector µ = 1.1. Finally, following Gertler (1999) we set the intertemporal elasticity
of substitution (1/(1− ρU )) = 0.25.
IV. Simulation Results
We first examine how well our theoretical model can explain the consequences
of demographic changes predicted in our empirical exercises. We then analyse
the effect of an increase in longevity, holding population constant, using different
specifications of the model to highlight the key transmission mechanisms.
A. Simulation: Projection
To incorporate the projections into the macro model, we set a path for the fer-
tility rate n˜, the longevity parameter ωr and the probability a young dependant
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becomes a worker (1 − ωy) such that we match the change in the UN projected
population growth, the change in the share of workers and retirees in each coun-
try. Therefore, as in the estimation, the changes in age structure describe the
demographic shock. We use actual population data 2005-2015 and UN projec-
tions 2016-2035. For instance, U.S. population growth is expected to fall from 0.9
to 0.55 percent, the share of workers (ages 20 to 60) to fall from 55 to 50 percent
and the share of retirees (over 60) to rise from 19 to 27 percent (see Figure 5).
The simulation starts at t= 2005, from the steady state of the model, and all
agents are able to predict the population dynamics for the next 30 years. As
noted above, our focus is on how the projected demographic changes affect the
macroeconomic variables.
Figure 5. Population Projections - United States
Figure 6 shows the results for U.S., Japan, Italy and France from 2010 till 2030
together with the empirical predictions.14 Our model does a fairly good job in
matching the predicted path of real rates and output growth for the countries
in our sample (in the online appendix we show the estimation and theoretical
simulations based on the UN predictions for four additional countries). For coun-
tries that are expected to suffer significant falls in fertility (e.g. Greece, Spain
and Japan) the model projections slightly overpredicts the fall in growth, while
for countries where fertility is expected to fall less (e.g. Australia, Canada and
U.S.) our growth projections match well with the empirical results. In general
the model tends to underpredict the fall in interest rates but as we discussed
in the empirical section in some specifications we find a smaller impact and as
such the benchmark results should be interpreted as a lower bound.15 Gagnon
et al. (2016) build a life-cycle model fully accounting for age heterogeneity but
14As we do not alter the steady state to match the characteristics of each country, focusing on the
changes in macroeconomic variables after a demographic change, we discard the first five years of the
simulation to decrease the influence of the initial steady state on the results.
15Given that at each year population features are changing, the theoretical model can sometimes
display sharp movements, particularly in growth rates. In most cases this occurs in 2015 when the shift
from historical to projected data occurs. For instance, see the population growth path used for the U.S.
in Figure 5.
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as opposed to our framework, assumes an exogenous path for productivity. They
find that the expected drop in interest rates from the Great Recession until 2030
is around 75 basis points, while our projection shows a bigger fall, of around 180
basis points. The link between demographics and productivity in the future is
therefore a relevant factor in assessing and comparing the predictions.
The effect of demography on innovation is important in the match between our
theory and our estimates. That is driven by the elasticity of technological creation
to young workers (ρyw) and the changes in the share of young workers in total
population (γyw = Γyw/Nt). As longevity increases, this share falls. We modify
the creation of ideas such that innovation is linked to the ratio of young worker to
the total number of workers (γˆyw = Γyw/Nw,t), reducing the effect of changes in
longevity on the results. Nonetheless, we find that the theoretical projections are
very similar (results are shown in the online appendix). The two main reasons
for this are: (i) the expected drop in fertility is important in depressing γyw
and subsequently innovation and (ii) as we re-calibrate the relationship between
demographics and innovation following the same procedure but now with the
modified shares Sˆγˆ,j , ρyw increases to 0.6, thus the elasticity of innovation to age
structure is higher in this specification.
Figure 6. Simulation: Projection
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B. Simulation: Ageing
Most economies during our estimation period experienced increasing life expec-
tancy and falling fertility resulting in an increasing share of retirees. We reflect
these changes in the model by smoothly increasing ωr such that the average re-
tiree lives an additional 10 years, increasing societies’ average age and doubling
the share of retirees. We hold population growth (gn = Nt+1/Nt) constant and as
such, fertility must decrease during the first part of the adjustment process. As
a result we are able to separate the effects of a drop in fertility and ageing while
controlling for population growth as done in our estimation. Once again, fertility
and mortality translate into changes in dependency ratios (young - ζy, and old -
ζr), which concisely describe the age structure with 3 generations.
16
We do this exercise for different specifications of our model. All results are
presented in Figure 7. In the benchmark specification (depicted as Benchmark)
we observe that the effects of increased longevity and decreased fertility in our
theoretical model matches our empirical estimates. In the medium run we observe
lower growth (g), lower investment and lower interest rates (R). These effects
are a product of three key mechanisms through which demography impacts the
economy.
First, increased longevity means workers expect to live longer, so they increase
savings and asset accumulation and reduce consumption causing real interest rates
to fall. The additional savings are allocated to investment in capital and inno-
vation, pushing the growth rate of output up. Therefore, life-cycle consumption
adjustment, our first mechanism, which is predominantly a demand or expendi-
ture effect, leads to an increase in growth rates.17 This mechanism matches our
estimates where ageing has a negative effect on interest rates. Our model indi-
cates that this is a result of workers savings more and occurs despite the higher
proportion of retirees (ζr increases), who are dissaving.
The second mechanism works through the adjustment of education to the de-
crease in fertility that leads to a drop in the ratio of young dependants (ζy). As
workers increase their savings for retirement, investment in education falls. Ho-
wever, as ζy falls, the per capita investment in education increases, leading to a
growth in human capital (gξ). This human capital effect pushes the growth rate
up, but it has a small contribution when technology is endogenous.18
Finally, the third mechanism works through the proportion of young workers
having a positive effect on the productivity of the innovation process. Ageing
16Note that as population growth is kept constant the inclusion of a population measure on the
congestion factor [(Ψ˜t)ρ(St)1−ρN
ρyw
t ] does not affect the results of this simulation exercise. Effectively,
in this case the share of workers in innovation is equal to scale of workers in innovation.
17Our model cannot generate a paradox of thrift such that greater desire to save decreases aggregate
demand sufficiently to mean that no additional savings is done. As a result, additional resources always
flow to the innovation sector increasing growth. Altering the aggregate demand features of the model
may generate stronger negative effects on growth due to lower consumption.
18Allowing for the accumulation of human capital during the working life as well as during youth
might increase its importance (see Ludwig et al. (2012) for a framework where accumulation also occurs
during the working life).
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causes (γyw) to fall, reducing invention. This process is particularly strong when
fertility falls. The lags between innovation and adoption mean that this negative
effect takes time but eventually it offsets the positive effect due to increased
savings so after 40 years growth reaches it lowest point. As the old dependency
ratio (ζr) reaches its new stationary level, fertility increases, returning back to its
steady state value. As a result, only the change in longevity influences the long-
term equilibrium. As the average age of the population has increased, γyw is lower
at the new steady state and the final effect of the growth rate is mildly negative.
This direct link between innovation and demographic structure, which we refer as
our main aggregate supply effect, is supported by our estimates. Ageing leads to
lower patent applications and thus to potentially lower contribution of innovation
to growth.
Figure 7. Simulation: Ageing
We run three additional simulations next to the benchmark model to assess
how each mechanism contributes to lower investment, growth and real rates.19
Absence of Aggregate Supply Channel: Here we eliminate the link between
innovation and demographic structure, assuming workers of all ages contribute
equally to innovation, setting ρyw = 0. We denote this simulation in Figure 7
19We also consider an extension where the second mechanism is reinforced by assuming that not
only the share of young workers affects innovation, but the new workers’ higher level of human capital
also boosts the productivity of innovation. We find that in this case the negative effect of fertility on
innovation is only mildly offset.
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as No AS Channel (ρyw = 0). We observe that the long-run effect on growth,
investment and interest rate are now positive. Both human capital accumulation
(second mechanism) and increase in savings due to the life-cycle consumption
channels (first mechanism) in general accelerate growth and lead to an increase
in investment. The life-cycle mechanism still leads to a decrease in the marginal
propensity to consume (MPC) of workers, however, the additional savings have a
productive use in the innovation sector and hence real rates increase. Note that in
a model without endogenous growth, the increase in longevity and subsequent fall
in the MPC of workers, leads to capital deepening and lower real rates, as shown
in Carvalho et al. (2016). However, introducing an innovation sector implies that
the additional savings boost innovation and productivity such the the marginal
product of capital does not decrease.
Shifting Age Distribution: Jones (2010) argues that through time the age dis-
tribution of inventors at the moment of a great invention is shifting to the right.
Great inventions are happening later in the life of inventors. We therefore consi-
der the impact of the ageing process together with a shift in age productivity
curve such that the peak productivity occurs at 43 years old and not at the age
of 38, as in our benchmark calibration (see the online appendix for details). Such
a shift, according to our calibration, would lead to a change in the elasticity of
technological creation to population age structure (parameter ρyw). We denote
this simulation in Figure 7 as Shifting Age Distribution. We find that as the
population ages in tandem with an increase in the productivity of innovation of
older workers, the negative effects of longevity are offset. Thus, although the
lower fertility during the transition still produces a decrease in output growth,
population ageing leads to a smaller effect on growth, investment and interest
rates.
Pay-as-you-go Pensions and Health Expenditures: The initial increase in sa-
vings and reduced aggregate demand that results from the changes in demo-
graphic structure are not sufficient to create a decrease in the demand for new
varieties A such that the incentives for innovation are diminished. As a result, this
expenditure effect does not generate lower growth rates. However, most OECD
economies employ a pay-as-you-go pension scheme in which workers are taxed
to fund payments to an increasing share of retirees. Moreover, governments are
expected to continue financing ever increasing health expenditures for the ageing
population (see the ageing report - European Commission (2015)). We account
for these by augmenting our benchmark model with a pay-as-you pension scheme
and fully funded expenditures in health care. The details of this model extension
are shown in the online appendix. We set the replacement ratio (ratio of pen-
sion payment to labour income) to 40 percent matching most European pension
schemes and the ratio of health expenditure on old agents per capita to GDP of
12 percent, close to the numbers reported in European Commission (2015) and in
the US Medicare program (see AARP Public Policy Institute (2009) and Curto
et al. (2017)).
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In this extension, denoted Pension and Health, ageing leads to a contraction of
workers’ aggregate demand as they are forced to transfer a higher share of their
earnings to fund health and pension expenditures, but in contrast to what we
observe in the benchmark model, total savings are not directly affected. These
additional aggregate demand effects are sufficiently strong to generate a decrease
in the output growth rate in the long-run. However, this decrease is relatively
small compared to the effect generated by the supply channel, i.e. when ρyw > 0.
We therefore conclude that the link between demographics and innovation is cru-
cial in aligning the theoretical and empirical results of lower growth, investment
and real rates due to increased longevity and low fertility.
V. Conclusions
Gordon (2012) asks how much further could the frontier growth rate decline?
We provide an analysis that measures this decline focusing on the impact of demo-
graphic structure on the macroeconomy. Our results indicate that the age profile
of the population has both economically and statistically significant impacts on
output growth, investment, savings, hours worked per capita, real interest rates
and inflation. The magnitude of the long-term impact is large. Demographic
factors are predicted to depress average annual long-term GDP growth over the
current decade, 2015-2025, by 0.64 percent in our sample of OECD countries.
We also provide evidence of the link between demographic structure and innova-
tion: patent applications are positively affected by the share of the middle-aged
and negatively by retirees. Our empirical results are robust to a variety of fac-
tors including time effects, controlling for mortality and fertility trends and open
economy dynamics.
We develop a theoretical model that incorporates age heterogeneity and endo-
genous productivity. This model highlights three main channels by which demo-
graphics affects the macroeconomy: i) through life-cycle consumption decisions,
ii) through incentives to alter human capital accumulation and iii) through the
influence of young workers on the innovation process. The calibrated theoretical
model is able to replicate most of our empirical findings, and indicates that the
third channel, the demographic effect of ageing on innovation, is a particularly
important cause of reduced long-run growth. Our results indicate that the current
trend of population ageing and reduced fertility, expected to continue in the next
decades, may contribute to reduced output growth and real interest rates across
OECD economies.
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